LETTER

To the AUTHOR of an

EXAMINATION

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PRINCIPLES;

AND

An ENQUIRY into the CONDUCT of the

TWO B-----RS:

In which is proved,

By indisputable Facts of Foreign Transactions,

That the Two B-----RS are true Guardians to these Kingdoms; have done every Thing in their Power, to retrieve what was lost in a late Administration; that they have already recover'd more than could probably be expected; and are therefore falsly accused by the said Letter Writer.

Beneath Their Feet, pale ENVY bites ber Chain, And snaky DISCORD whets her Sting in wain. Sir John BEAUMONT.

DUBLIN:

Printed by James Espall, at the Corner of Copper-Alley on Cork-Hill, 1749. Tofthe Aureroa of an

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PRINCIPLES, &c. &c.

SIR,

Doubt not but you are much pleased with your late Performance, as it has been greedily received by Numbers of unwary and discontented People of all Ranks; for Detraction, how unthriving a Diet soever it is, will always be a standing Dish, and never want Guests, with keen Appetites, to devour it. Curiosity will make such Works vendible to many, but sew Men of Judgment and Equity will risque their Approbation of them, till the Veracity of that Misconduct or Male-Administration charged therein, shall be, by creditable and concurring Testimonies, confirmed.

. I should congratulate you fincerely upon that Satisfaction, which every fine Author, and indeed every foolish Scribbler

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must indulge, when he appears in Publick, and his Writings are honoured with that favourable Reception, which yours would flatter us they have met with, if you had not been erroneous in the very essential part, that is Truth itself; wherein, you are greatly deficient in those Facts you affert; and these are so sophisticated with your own Suppositions, that if there is any solid Grain in the Mass of your Allegations, it cannot be sisted by any indifferent Persons from the Chaff; as none, but the Two B—rs, whom you charge, can be the Persons who knew if they are true or salse.

If you had been furnished with Candour, as well as Truth, I would not only have applauded the Eloquence of your Performance, but also the Importance of your Discoveries; notwithstanding the great Sorrow and Uneafiness it would have given me, to think that this happy Island, for which all its Inhabitants ought to have the highest Esteem, should be deceived, and plunged into irretrievable Ruin by its own Guardians; but, as you have not really Copied the Face of the Truth to the Life, or have, thro' an Extremity in Proportions, difforted the Features of it, I must rather commiserate, than congratulate you upon the Execution of your Work; and doubt not, in the least, but, whenever you shall grow so Fortunate as to be relieved out of your Prejudices, and to confider these Affairs with Temper and Impartiality, that then, you will inwardly feel, at least, if not outwardly express, some Sentiments of Remorfe or Compunction, for the Disturbance and Contention you have attempted to raife, and unfeignedly repent that you ever was an Instrument to foment Factions, and give Occasion for any Domestic Feuds and Animosities in this Realm, fettled as it now is, in a State of Tranquility; by blafting and befpattering the Characters of two fuch eminent Members in the Administration thereof.

Whoever you are, Sir, and what your Principles, or what your Ends, by this Enquiry into the Conduct of those Ministers, I am utterly a Stranger; and will not, after your Example, set my Invention to hard Labour, in beating out such disingenuous Suppositions and Motives for your Conduct,

Conduct, as you have done for theirs; but will be so charitable as to believe, as in one place you fay, that you are a fincere Friend, and Well-wisher to the Royal Family now reigning, and to your Country; notwithstanding that, by the Air of that Language you use upon this Topic, one might be inclined to suspect your Sincerity. But this, I can affure you, whatever Friend you are to K-Country, that your Performance against the Two B----rs can only ferve the facobite Party; who are ever waiting, to keep their hungry Hopes from starving, for such Bones Their crafty Ring-leaders know how to of Contention. convert all manner of Divisions, that in any Shape may arise in the Government, to the Nourishment of their feeble and finking Cause; and how to revive, by these intestine Discontents the drooping Spirits of their bigotted and inconsiderate Followers, of which our foreign Enemies, in the End, are always fure to reap the Advantage: And to this want of Unanimity, to these Domestic Divisions and Circumventions is entirely owing, that the late War has proved so unsuccessful; and not to the Misconduct of Two rs, as you would very unjustly perfuade us.

Not only our neighbouring Nations, but all the World are furpriz'd, that neither Example nor Experience can eradicate that malignant Humour in us, of being ever reftless, impatient, and unsatisfied with one another; that we can neither be sensible of our own Prosperity, or never content with it; but still unhappy in the midst of Happiness. Are not Numbers of this Nation continually misled by deceitful Prospects, Pretensions and Prepossessions, even fometimes so fatally far, as to renounce their Duty and Allegiance, what they owe to their King, their Country, to their Family, Posterity and Themselves; of which we often fee many private and publick Instances of the greatest Calamity? So that it may be no great Master-piece in you, Sir, to please a few of many such People, with your Enquiry into the Conduct of the Two B - rs, especially as fuch Part of the People were already prejudiced against the Peace. But this Prejudice was the spurious Issue of Ignorance or Inconsideration. It was no where nourish'd, I fay, where there was a due Intelligence acquir'd of the State and Situation of Affairs; where there was a sufficient Knowledge of the Powers we had to cope with, and how long they had labour'd to deprive us, and our Allies, of that Power and Influence we formerly had; for we must not think our Enemies are such a Flock of Sheep as to be now driven where we pleafe. Our present State therefore, in thefe, and fuch like Lights confider'd, we shall eafily difcover which of the two Conditions were preferable, to continue a War not fo successful as would answer the End. or make a Peace not altogether to Beneficial as we could wish; fince it may possibly be, that as we stood not upon fuch advantageous Ground as would enable us to infift, in every Respect, upon our own Terms, we might be obliged to accept of fuch a Peace, as we have, to prevent a whole Torrent of Powers from over-whelming us; and in this Case, a scandalous War would have been more dishonourable, than even a Peace that had been fo.

It is in like Manner ridiculous, when our little Coffee-House Politicians exclaim in your Dialect, against an unsuccessful War, by comparing our Engagements Abroad, in the former, with those in later Times, and concluding with you, as the English Arms, under Edward III. and Henry V. as well as several other ancient and modern Heroes, were Victorious, and as they are not so now, so consequently, that all our Disappointments must be owing to our Ministers; never thinking how the State of Affairs Abroad have changed, how greatly our Enemies have grown in Power, and how universally Schemes, Companies and Corporations have been fram'd to deprive us of, or at least, Share with us, and our Allies, in the naval Power and Commerce we have so long enjoy'd, and to which we are so justly intitled.

But to render these Particulars more Manisest, and set them in a clear Light, I will transiently recite a sew Facts of the Transactions and Endeavours that have been used for those Purposes, these last Twenty Years, before the War broke out; and as they are Facts universally known to be 7

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true, they are less liable to be disputed: It is but of late. that the French and Northern Powers have nourish'd any Emulation in Naval Concerns. England and Holland boafted juftly of their Maritime Power, and the House of Austria was our faithful Ally, to make Divertions by Land on any Emergency. In this Posture of Affairs, the French suspected themselves to be never secure of their Plantations Abroad, and little Commerce they had, for they had too often experienced what the united Sea Powers of England. and Holland could do in this respect: And, our Northern Neighbours, did not think to engage too much in their favourite Naval Project, so long as this well calculated Power did subsist: Therefore, it was, on all Quarters resolved upon, to take all Opportunities to deffroy, or at least reduce this Power, that they might come in for a Share of the Commerce; and we thus enfeabled, it was apprehended to be no difficult Matter to obtain advantageous Settlements in Foreign Parts: And this, Sir, is, and has been for Years, the real Intentions of all our Neighbours; and for no other Reason than this, did they involve us in the War, of which some were Actors, and others Spectators; and the last did not chuse to affist us, tho" pretended Friends, and that, for the same Reason that the first did act

To compleat this favourite Scheme, which all Nations' and Powers were so fond of, and which the French Emilfaries artfully and industriously promoted in all Corners of the World, it was necessary to create a fort of Jealousy. between England and Holland; and several Turns of Affairs ferving for this Purpose effectually, they did bring the major Part of the States General over from the natural Interest of Great Britain, into that of France; for they had already experienced fufficiently in Queen Ann's War, that it would be in vain to compleat the Commercial Plan, altho' in a Manner united with Spain, in case the Dutch was in our Interest. All the World is sensible how well France succeeded in this Undertaking; for never would the late War have been so unsuccessful, if the Dutch had performed their Duty; which, for the fake of their own netural tural Interest, and the Obligation they were under by for lemn Treaties, they ought to have done.

Of this, Sir, you do not vouchfase to mention so much as one single Word; but the Web that is spun out of your Political Brains is very transparent, for we may plainly see, thro it, that if you had entered into these known Truths, you would not have been able to establish the Doctrine of your Chimerical Conceits against the Two B——rs: For, all the World knows, what Essorts and warm Solicitations they both made, to bring those deluded States to a just Sense of their Duty they owed themselves, in the Preservation and Desence of their Liberties and Properties; and it will hardly ever be credited by Posterity, that all the Intreaties made to that effect, could not avail with those corrupt Governors.

These Facts, Sir, are so well known, and the Negotiations at the Hague on this Head, are so publick, that they alone would be sufficient to clear the Two B——rs from your Supposition, that, They aimed at nothing else but to ruin the War.

However, those Efforts of the Two B——rs were not altogether ineffectual, for so they awakened the People in Holland, that they very justly rescued the Administration out of the Hands of those corrupted Magistrates, and put it into those of their true and natural Patriot, the P——of O——; and this single Event, in which the Two B——rs had so eminent a Share, and such a visible Influence, is conspicuously pregnant with so many promising Prospects of Advantage, that we are likely, in the Space of a few Years, to retrieve and settle, upon a most lasting Basis, whatever we have lost by the late War.

I beg, Sir, for the Sake of common Justice, make yourself acquainted with the Criss of this great Affair; then
you will find, that we are indebted for this signal and important Revolution, in a very considerable Degree, to
these Two B——rs: For never would the People of
Holland

Holland have settled their Government, in the hopeful Hands they actually have done, if they had not been spirited thereto, by the constant Solicitations which the Two B—rs caused to be made, in the most pathetic and perswafive Manner to the States General, to exert themselves, and act their Part heartily in the Common Cause, which was now become dangerous to the last Degree. And, furely these Efforts are far from ruining a War.

Here in England, the French play'd a Game quite different from that in Holland, or elsewhere. They lull'd the late Sir R ____ into pacific Measures, and the Hypocrify, or if you please, the outward pacific Disposition of Cardinal Fleury, was too spacious, too plausible, and too fashionable to be left unimitated in good Earnest by him. The first Fruits of this Pacific Plan, which he, by the foft Sophistry; or fallacious Arguments of French Emissaries, was persuaded into, was the Treaty of Hanover, against Spain, and the Emperor Charles VI. This Treaty was succeeded by that of Sevil, to make Don Carlos King of Naples and Sicily; and then in 1734, a Neutrality was advised, when the Emperor was at War with France; for Cardinal Fleury eafily perfuaded Sir R ____ when that France was at Peace with all the World, even in the midst of a bloody War. By this Means France was ftrengthened by the Acquisition of Lorrain and Bar; and thus he labour'd for Twenty successive Years, to aggrandize the French King, at the Expence, and to the Destruction of our old and natural Ally the House of Austria, at a Time when our Circumstances and Safety required to affist, with our utmost Power, that August House; not to mention the folemn Treaties, whereby we were obliged fo to do.

Here you observe, that our natural Enemies had gained considerable Power, at the Expence of our natural Allies, by the former M—r's Misconduct; whereby the Situation of Affairs wearing quite another Aspect, consequently gave also another Face to the succeeding War, in the Course or Conclusion whereof, the Two B—rs cannot justly be accused, because they have not only performed all that was

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in their Power to retrieve what was lost in their Predeceffors Administration, but have actually already retrieved some Part of it; and I dare venture to assure you, that if they had not gained Ground in this Respect, we should as yet, not have been able to obtain any Peace; as will hereaster more evidently appear.

The State Locusts, or Emissaries of France, were not satisfied that they had tutor'd Sir R—— W—— in Public Affairs, to their Hearts Content, but they must also have a Hand in the Family Affairs, which concerned these Kingdoms; and Sir R—— was weak enough to be intirely sway'd by them in these: For as soon as there seem'd to be a Probability that the present K—— of P—— might be married to our P—— so R——, then they considered that by these Means the two Houses might be in such a Manner cemented, and their Interest or Power so strengthened, as to overthrow the whole Scheme they were labouring at: Therefore there was nothing more necessary, than to make as wide a Breach between the Houses of H—— r and B——— g as they could; and how far they have succeeded, all the World knows.

As thus the Marriage between P ____ and the P___ is ___ was frustrated, and the P___ is must be wedded for their Purpose; our wise M—— was at once advised to marry her to the P—— of O——, because it would no where serve any better Ends than in Holland. They had preached up all the Sweetness of Power and Grandeur, of which all Men are fond, to their Party in the Senate at the Hague; and, as they once had obtained Power, they advised them to keep it any Rate; whereby having instill'd a Jealousy in the Faction they had won over of the Pof O, it was very easy to foment and encrease it, by frightening them with Apprehensions of his near and potent Father-in-Law. How much fuch Infinuations have ferved the French Cause, and how much the Common Cause has fuffer'd by their finister Artifices, I need not repeat here, it being obvious to all the World. But God be thanked, the Scene, beyond their Power to prevent it, is changed for the the better; the P—— of O——, instead of being curbed and restrained to that Scantling of Power that was endeavoured by the Frenchified Partizans, is at the Head of Affairs; and we want nothing but the hearty Union of ourselves with him, and then we shall reap the salutary Confequences thereof.

As foon as the French had obtained Lorrain and Bar. Don Garlos was fettled upon the Throne of Naples and Sieilly; and nothing was to be got more in the Emperor Charles the VIth's Life Time; then, they promoted a Party Cabal at the Courts of Vienna and Petersbourg; where nothing cou'd ferve their Purpose so hopefully as a War with the Turks; and the Emperor was weak enough, to break that Peace with them which was not then expir'd. But this Stroke of French Policy, was calculated for no other End than to weaken still more the House of Austria, and particularly in that Part of the World from whence came those brave Fellows, the Pandours, who are the Terror of the French; and how well our Enemies succeeded in this Point, is but too well known to all the World; for by this very Project, the House of Austria lost, very near two Kingdoms, which, by the Treaty of Belgrade, were refigned to the Turks; and which, with those in Italy, make four in Number; and this, within the Space of eight Years Time.

The Peace with the Turks was huddled up under French Mediation, which advised the Imperial Troops to be disbanded, and, in short, the whole Army to be destroy'd; for they made the Court of Vienna believe, with their delusive or superficial Guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, that there never wou'd be any more Occasion for Military Men; and this also was not unpalatably, swallow'd down by the Imperial Ministry, such Trust and Confidence it reposed in them, notwithstanding the disingaged, and more penetrating Standers-by, did plainly discern, that the French acted most disingenuously, and by their plausible Pretensions, obtruded the utmost Impositions in this Matter, on Behalf of the Emperor. The Pope's Nuncio, then at the

Court of Vienna, was very much exasperated at these their base juggling Tricks, and very zealously inveigh'd against the most Unchristian Proceedings of those that call themselves, "Most Christian People; insisting, that by their deceitful and ensnaring Management, they had, to the great Detriment of Christendom, sacrificed the Austrian Terretories to a Pack of Insidels and Barbarians, only for their own wicked private Ends." Which Expressions did so enrage the M—— of M——x, and made such an Ebulition of his French Blood, that he laid violent Hands on poor Nuncio, and can'd him in the Drawing-Room before the Emperor's Face.

Thus far they proceeded, during the Emperor's Life; but as they cou'd advance no further, his Death became necessary to compleat the Business they had in hand. The Emperor soon after, within a few Months, did actually die; which, to me, is very remarkable, that this Monarch shou'd so complaisantly make his Departure out of this Life, just at the Time it was wish'd for, to perfect the Schemes they had concerted.

But it is publickly known, that this Monarch was poifon'd with Aqua Tuffana; and that his Favorite Page, a
Spaniard by Birth, to whom he bequeathed a confiderable
Legacy, did commit this most horrid and villanous Action.
What Inducements he had, or by whose Instigation it was
perform'd, I am not able to inform you, but it is best
known to those Magistrates of Milan, who took his Deposition, or Confession, a short Time before his Death, of
this hellish and inhuman Deed; which he proved, and corroborated by Letters, and other Papers of his Confederates.

The whole Proceedings of his Examination, &c. were transmitted to Vienna, and I heartily wish, that Court wou'd publish this Tragical History, with every individual Circumstance, that the whole World might be convinced, and behold with Horror and Indignation, who it was that thus treacherously conspired the Death of that most clement and virtuous Prince.

Thus,

Thus, Sir, you see at one View, what our Neighbours have been at; that they have gained, by leading Sir R——W—— so unseasonably into pacifick Dispositions; more Mischief to us, than all the united Forces of France were able to do in twenty Years Time; and it is without dispute, to the Errors and Mistakes of the said late Minister owing, that the War has not been so successful, as we cou'd wish. But as under those manifest Disadvantages, the two B—rs came into the Administration, and have used their utmost Endeavours to recover what was lost; it is therefore unreasonable Injustice to Charge she two B—rs with the Inadvertancies, of another Man. But to proceed to some other Particulars.

First, Sir, I will shew you more distinctly, how you have been misinformed in, or have misrepresented, the Conduct of the two B—rs in our Transactions Abroad.

Secondly, I will make it appear, that they have done more than in moral Probability cou'd be expected, under our present Circumstances.

Lastly, How the Advantages they have actually obtained, may be improved, to retrieve and recover that we had lost, by the Management of the late M—r; and if you, Sir, to these healing and salutary Endeavours, wherein the Concord and Prosperity of the Nation is so deeply concern'd, will join your great and able Talents, instead of employing them to promote Murmurs, and multiply Malecontents, you may, in some Degree, rival the B—rs themselves in Glory, those illustrious Gemini, that are always shining, but never at rest, till you become at last, both Castor and Pollux too.

First then, As soon as the Emperor was dead, all Parts, at least France and Spain, were seemingly in Suspence for a Time, before any Alliance was concluded with P - a and B - a; and P - a was the first that opened the Scene, with a Demand of several Dukedoms in S - a; however,

however, this Monarch was, as yet, a Stranger to his Vicsories and even those great Masters of all crooked Conduct, the collusive French did not chuse to engage too closely, or engraft themselves, till they saw those hopeful Bloffoms of his Military Power, which promifed to Crown the Progress thereof, with the Fruits of Success. In these Circumstances, the Court of B-n was rather inclin'd to a Composition, and to Proposals extreamly favourable to the House of Austria; and particular Advantages for the Common Cause were actually offered, but were rejected at the Courts of V-a and L-n. Upon what Account these Proposals were disregarded, I will not take upon me to resolve: But this I can say, That the Two B-rs. to my certain Knowledge, did every Thing in their Power. who were not then at the Head of Affairs, to preserve the K of P ain our Interest. And it always has been the favourite Scheme of the Two B-rs, to restore a good Harmony with that most potent M____h who is so nearly in Blood allied to us; and that this is the most advantageous Interest we can cultivate, for the good of the Common Cause, and our own Preservation, will appear undeniable at the first View.

· But as this was not brought to pass, which was absolutely owing to the M—rs; and notwithstanding the ill Success of Affairs the two B-rs had manifestly no other defire than to render the War victorious. They advised, by all Means, that it should be endeavoured to divert his P ___ from making any further Progress, who was now become very Formidable; and thro' the preffing Remonstrances of the Two B --- rs, to which the Solicitations of the Hungarian Ministers being joined, two Ambassadors were sent to him in the Field; whether also Baron Ginkel, from the States General, repair'd for the fame Purpose; and these Ministers were so successful, as to obtain a Peace from a powerful M——ch in the midst of his Conquests; and they thus produced the Treaty of Breflau. This Negociation was transacted folely by the Advice or Addresses of the Two B --- rs; and to their everlasting Honour, must it be recorded, that this important Accommodation was brought about.

I know very well, that there are others, to whom, the Merit of the last mentioned Transaction is ascrib'd; but as all Men are fond of having their Names and Characters embroider'd over with glittering Actions; so there are never wanting fome, who, for their own private Interest, will dispoil the true Proprietors of them, and publickly dress out those, whose Patronage they are courting, in the Plumage that belongs to others. And this being the Case here, we must restore the Mesit of this Affair to its right Owners, and no longer attempt to diveft the Two B-rs of it; and, as I hope you are a Gentleman of Candour and Humanity, I persuade myself that you will, for Justice-sake, enquire first into the real Truth, without Passion or Prejudice, of this, and every other Particular, relating to the Conduct of these, or any other eminent Persons, who have engag'd themselves in the National Service, before you appear in Publick again, to inflame the Minds of the unthinking, or unpacified Part of Mankind.

It is manifest, the Two B-rs are not puff'd up with that Vain-glory of Popularity, or are inclined to that oftentatious Parade of representing the minutest Atome of every Achievement through large magnifying Glaffes to the Publick, as their Neighbours, who refide in the capital Region of Vanity, are apt to do. I affure you, if they were thus disposed, there are Matters enough of the most solid and fignal Confequence, of the most weighty Import, in which they have been concerned, and for which they might be most justly and honourably celebrated, without the need of any fuch little Aids as magnifying Glaffes, Trumpets, and the like. And tho' the Actions of great Men appear with a native Grandeur, they rather chuse to deserve, than desire our Approbation of them; but the less they defire it, the more it is paid them, and no Praise flows so pure, as that which is unrequested, that which is voluntary; nor would it distill so readily from my Pen, if it were not a Free Offering, of which, those whom it concerns, are intire-unacquainted.

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The Ministers aforesaid, having by the said Treaty of Bresau, considerably weaken'd the Enemy, which was also a Means to rescue Saxony from under the Bondage of France; they next endeavour'd to strengthen the Allies at any Rate, and by their Advice, the Treaty of Warsau was produced; and this Treaty would absolutely have been Advantageous to us in the highest Degree, if the L — d C—t had not committed that great Oversight of not inviting the K— of P— into the Treaty of Worms; and I believe it was rejected, for no other Reason, but because the two B—rs did advise it; for if P— had been invited, it is more than probable, that he, at that Time, would have heartily acceded to the same, and by this Means prevented a second Rupture.

These, Sir, are all Circumstances which indisputably prove, that the two B—rs labour'd at nothing less than to make the War as victorious as possible, and to retrieve those Honours, Dignities and Privileges of the Nation, which were lost in former Ministries; contrary to what you endeavour to persuade us, viz. That they strove to render the same precarious and unsuccessful.

Page 5, You labour with all your Power to exclude the two B -rs from every Thing that is noble, meritorious, and ferviceably perform'd, during the Course of the War; and invest not only a Favourite of yours with the same, but what is more Criminal, you charge the two B-rs with fuch Measures as tend to nothing less than to the Destruction of all that was obtained in Favour of the Common Cause. This Affertion is very extraordinary, as it is an Affair, whereof the Truth is so easily compas'd; and therefore, I only beg that you would, without Prejudice or Animosity, penetrate to the Foundation of this Matter, then you will find what I affirm, to be Truth, viz. That the two B -rs, had the greatest Share in those Transactions that produced such a notable Crisis in Favour of the Common Caufe, wherewith you vainly endeavour to embellish the Character, or magnify the Merits of others.

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You charge in your Letter, Page 4, the two B-rs with Imposition and Deceit, upon every Individual, as well as the whole Nation: But this, Sir, give me Leave to tell you, is but like the rest, only your own ipfe Dixit; and it would be great Injustice to allow this alone for sufficient Evidence. For all the World knows, that the two B-rs never did attempt to deprive us, or, in any Shape, abridge or abolish the Habeas Corpus Act, and trying High Treafon by a Tury, the two fundamental Supporters of our Liberties; upon which Rock King James the fecond split, and beat himself to Pieces; nor ever would have lost his Crown, had he left these two Points in Statu-quo, and not attempted to overturn them. And as these two Points are the Fountains of all our Rights, Liberties and Privileges, is it not manifest, from their very Actions, that the two B——rs are the religious Guardians and Preservers of these our facred Pledges? Nor can it be deny'd, that next to God, it is owing to the Measures of the two B-rs, that these three Kingdoms were not enflav'd in the late Rebellion, when both our Liberties and Fortunes were abfolutely in the greatest Peril. How surprising was it therefore that those, so much pretended Patriots, could appear fo easy, quiet, and with such chearful Aspects, while they faw their Country in fuch imminent Danger, without advancing one Step to its Relief: What must one think of fuch Men?

It may perhaps be objected, as sometimes it has, by the Disaffected been, that in the late Rebellion, the Kingdom was not in any Danger at all of losing its Rights and Liberties; and that it was only to frighten the People with Slavery, &c. in order to blacken those Political Enthusiasts, the Jacobites. However plausible this Supposition may appear, at the first Glance, I can assure you the Truth is otherwise; for upon the strictest Scrutiny that has been made, of the Designs and Endeavours of this Faction, it may be positively afferted that the present Jacobites are still as strongly tinctur'd with the Notions of despotic Power, as ever their Predecessors were in King

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You charge in your Letter, Page 4, the two B-rs with Imposition and Deceit, upon every Individual, as well as the whole Nation: But this, Sir, give me Leave to tell you, is but like the rest, only your own ipse Dixit; and it would be great Injustice to allow this alone for sufficient Evidence. For all the World knows, that the two B-rs never did attempt to deprive us, or, in any Shape, abridge or abolish the Habeas Corpus Act, and trying High Treafon by a Jury, the two fundamental Supporters of our Liberties; upon which Rock King James the fecond split, and beat himself to Pieces; nor ever would have lost his Crown, had he left these two Points in Statu-quo, and not attempted to overturn them. And as these two Points are the Fountains of all our Rights, Liberties and Privileges, is it not manifest, from their very Actions, that the two B---rs are the religious Guardians and Prefervers of these our facred Pledges? Nor can it be deny'd, that next to God, it is owing to the Measures of the two B-rs, that these three Kingdoms were not enslav'd in the late Rebellion, when both our Liberties and Fortunes were abfolutely in the greatest Peril. How surprising was it therefore that those, so much pretended Patriots, could appear so easy, quiet, and with such chearful Aspects, while they faw their Country in such imminent Danger, without advancing one Step to its Relief: What must one think of fuch Men?

It may perhaps be objected, as sometimes it has, by the Disaffected been, that in the late Rebellion, the Kingdom was not in any Danger at all of losing its Rights and Liberties; and that it was only to frighten the People with Slavery, &c. in order to blacken those Political Enthusiasts, the Jacobites. However plausible this Supposition may appear, at the first Glance, I can assure you the Truth is otherwise; for upon the strictest Scrutiny that has been made, of the Designs and Endeavours of this Faction, it may be positively afferted that the present Jacobites are still as strongly tinctur'd with the Notions of despotic Power, as ever their Predecessors were in King

Fames the second's Time; and have fill, to this very Day, the same Inclination to abolish the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Trial of High Treason by a Jury; and so long as this Blood runs in their Veins, no reasonable Creature, who has any Regard for that Freedom which is the Birth-right of his Species, can have any Compassion for Men of such Principles, as would so basely subvert it, but abhor a Government that would deprive its Subjects of fuch natural Rights. Therefore those pretended Patriots, who did not lend an helping Hand in that perilous Criss, are not to be excus'd, nor in any Shape to be allow'd that glorious Title they are so presumptuously fond of: But as the present Government does strictly preserve the ancient Rights and Liberties of the Subjects, it is but just and grateful in all Men, who are protected under the comfortable Shelter thereof, to acknowledge the invaluable Bleffing, and applaud the Powers that dispense it: And as the two B-rs have been indefatigable in the Cultivation of these and many other National Felicities, it must be the blackest Ingratitude imaginable to charge them with National Imposition and Deceit.

You affure us, Page 8, that the Emperor, Charles VII. after the Battle of Dettingen, made some Overtures, extremely favourable at Hanau, which were rejected by the two B-rs. We were indeed inform'd, at that Time, of some Proposals in the Publick Papers; but they were in no wife so favourable as you represent them to have been. The two B-rs did endeavour to improve the Offers at that Juncture made; but when they found those Propofals to be of fuch a Nature as could not answer the Advantages that were to be reasonably expected, they justly and prudently rejected them; and, in Fact, these Propofals of the Emperor were but Shadows of Advantage, the Issue of mere Convenience, or only the Fruits of Political Infincerity, and never really intended on his Part, but what he offer'd, for no other Purpose than to withdraw the English Army from the Neighbourhood of Franckfort, where he then refided, and was under Apprehensions that they would block him up in the City: And if we should allow allow that they might have forced the Emperor, at that Time, into any Terms, we see no Reason to grant that the two B—rs were accountable for the Omission.

You tell us likewise, that there was at the same Time a Proposal made at Hanau, of a Match between the Emperor's Daughter and the Archduke, and that he was to be elected King of the Romans: This Piece of News never did I hear of before, altho' I was well informed, at that Time, of the Transactions at the Imperial Court, then at Franckfort. But there seems to me, in this Proposition, not only a very great Inconsistency, but almost a moral Impossibility; for the Archduke was then in his Cradle, an Infant, but three Years old, at which Time, the youngest Princess of Bavaria was so many Years older, as would have rendered the Disproportion in such a Match too unequal, too unreasonable, for the Court of Vienna to allow of.

And supposing the Emperor had at this Time been reconciled to the Court of Vienna, and his Troops withdrawn from the French, this would not have been of fuch happy Effect as you imagine; for all the World knows, that his Forces were of no determinate Consequence one Way or other, therefore it would have avail'd nothing with France; but we, in Fact, should have brought an additional Burthen of an 100,000 l. upon ourselves, and France would have been eased and served by this very Treaty, in case it had been concluded; for it is univerfally known, that this Emperor had nothing to subsist on but the Pensions and Subsidies he received from the Court of France: Therefore if we had allowed the Emperor a Penfion upon these Conditions, that of France would have ceased; and this Expense to support the Emperor, would not only have repaired the Loss of the Bavarian Forces, but have greatly contributed to augment their Army; and besides paying the Bavarian Troops, as they were obliged to do, we should have faved them full as much as our Pension, for they never then would have made a Peace, but certainly continued the War longer, and with greater Vigor, to perfect the Naval Plan; and this feems so much more probable, in that great Crisis of of Affairs, at the Emperor's Death, when Bavaria was recovered and joined to our Interest: But it did not in any Degree whatsoever alter the Military System of France; so that, in Fact, if ever the Treaty of Hanau had succeeded, it would have been no more, than as if we had annually given 100,000 k to the French, to make their War more effectual against ourselves; and this would have been an admirable Piece of Policy!

It is then indisputable, that the grand Mistake lay in the Omission of making the Treaty of Worms, without inviting the K— of P—a into it: All Europe was at that Time amaz'd, that an Alliance of such Importance, and of which that Treaty stood in such need, was neglected. For if the K— of P—a had acceded to this Treaty, as he would undoubtedly have done, if he had been properly invited, then the Emperor would have been obliged to follow his Steps; the French Schemes would have been thereby totally frustrated, and all their Acts deseated. But the two B—rs not being consulted on this Head, no Inadvertency that occur'd in the said Negotiation, can be laid at their Door.

As to what is related, Page 12, That the two B-rs had prevented the fending of a Squadron into the East Indies, and that the E-t I-a C-y might thank the two B-rs for what was done by Mr. de la Bourdannois; for this Accufation, I fay, like the rest of your Incoherencies before observed, we have no other Authority offer'd, but your own Word; and as this Affair is of fuch a Nature, that no body but a Member of the Privy Council can be thoroughly acquainted with the Truth of it, it is but just to fuspend our Belief, as of a Matter related by a prejudiced and nameless Author, untestified or unconfirmed by any Voucher at all: And indeed what Credit can be given to any other Part of fuch an Author, who not only shews himself of such a doubtful Gender in the Interest of his Country, but one who is so incessantly contradicting himfelf; whose Sentiments are in such continual Variation ahout two and the same Persons; whose Weathercock Judg-

ment is ever representing them, in every one, and all of their Actions, at one and the same Time, Men, both of the deepest and shallowest Capacity? If this Accusation had been design'd to have any Weight with the considerate Part of your Readers, it ought to have been afferted under the Authority of some Privy Counsellor, who was present when the fending of a Squadron into the East Indies was under Debate; and even then, the Conduct of the two B-rs ought not, at first Sight, to be peremptorily consider'd in that violent Construction you would put upon it, till we had heard and examin'd the Motives and Arguments wherewith they opposed and rejected this Expedition, and compared them with the State of those relative Circumstances. which might further confirm the Inexpediency thereof: which Arguments or Circumstances, undoubtedly must have been very cogent and convincing, if it be true, as is afferted, that they prevailed upon a whole Council Board, at a Time too, when they were not intirely at the Head of Affairs. he fame Time a Tath,

In Page 13, we meet with the fecond of your three notable Instances of Accusation, which is the Misunderstanding between Matthews and Leftock; and here we are, with the usual Authority, assur'd that Lestock would not fight: You conclude that it must be so, because it was certainly reported in France; that he would not engage against them whenever an Action should offer. I think, as this Matter has been brought to a fair Trial, and Leftock, under the greatest Disadvantages, clear'd himself in the Face of the Publick; it is therefore one of the weakest and most partial Ways of reasoning, to draw a Character of any Countryman from the vulgar Rumours that might be foread of him in France, and thereby to question, or attempt to overthrow a publick Enquiry, before which Leftock had vindicated and justified his Conduct, which M-s was not able to disprove, tho' he had infinitely the Advantage of Leftock, for he was then a popular Man, and the whole Town in his Fayour, which at the fame Time was highly prejudiced against Lestock. It is therefore a very coarse Way of arguing, quite unbecoming and beneath a Gentleman, to think

of strengthening his Accusations with soul, vulgar or violent Language, when Truth, Reason and Probability are deficient, such as the Words infamous, furious, malignity, &c. as we find in this Page, and many more of the like dirty Complexion, dispersed throughout the whole Persormance.

Now let us proceed to the third and last of your notable First, You give us a Calculation of the Confederate Army that made the Campaign in the Year 1744. Secondly, Your Care is to make the French weak enough, and to perfuade us, that we were able to make great Efforts against them at that Time. And, Thirdly, You charge the two B-rs with giving Orders to Marshal Wade for not fighting, or making Head against the Enemy. I admit, that the French Army was not so strong in Flanders during this Campaign, as they were afterwards in others, because the French Forces were divided, and chiefly employ'd in Alface against Prince Charles of Lorrain; but then it is at the same Time a Truth, that Marshal Wade never did receive fuch Orders of Prohibition from the two B--- rs as you ascribe to them: For the Marshal's Instructions or Orders were, to gain all such Advantages with his Army over the Enemy, as by a prudent Conduct he most probably might; in which, undoubtedly, attacking and fighting the Enemy is imply'd; and that the most effectual Means of defeating the Enemy, was not omitted in the Marshal's Orders, is obvious to all Europe, by the Efforts and Endeavours he made this very Campaign, in fuch Manner as would have rendered the fame notably fuccessful to the Common Cause, by signal Actions and Exploits, had he not been interrupted. For in these very Endeavours he was opposed by the Dutch and Austrian Commanders, who being Gentlemen that were possessed of large Estates and Effects in this Country, and having impatiently flatter'd themselves with very fanguine Expectations of a fudden Peace, they strengously strove to preferve, as long as they possibly could, that Country on every Side in which their Properties to largely lay, from being made the acting Theatre, or Seat of War, which might have

have deftroy'd and laid every Thing desolate about them. And the more effectually to prevent any Engagement of the Enemy in those Parts, they used their utmost Power to engross the Command of the Army in Flanders to themselves; which, however, when the Court of Vienna grew acquainted with their narrow and felf-ended Purpofes, they declined intrusting the same any further with Men of fuch unsafe Principles, as were to be sway'd by their own private and particular Interest more than the general Safety and Welfare, or Good of the Common Caufe. Refusal of such Trust, or Confidence in them, both publickly testified where the Misbehaviour and Blame lay, and at the same Time discover'd the true Cause why Marshal Wade could not compleat any effectual or decifive Engagement with the Enemy: 'Twas therefore owing to the Obstructions of those who should have been Co-operators in the War, and not to any pretended Restraint proceeding from the Orders of the two B—rs, as it is unjustly and maliciously alledg'd against them; and this appears now undeniably evident from that Misunderstanding between the commanding Officers of the Confederate Army, which was caused by, and did visibly ensue, upon the said Opposition.

In the 14th Page we find another Accusation, of which fuch a notable Author as yourfelf might have made a fourth notable Instance; and this is the Proposals of the Generals Ligoniere and Somerfield, for attacking and laying Siege to Mauberg and Landrecy. And then you tell us by what Means the younger B——r frustrated this hopeful Scheme, of which you promife fuch extraordinary Advantages. may believe it to be true, that the younger B-r might delay the immediate Entrance upon, or Execution of this Enterprize, till fuch Time as the Sentimenrs of the Dutch. their Dislike or Approbation, or how their Resolutions stood towards this Proposition were known. And, in Truth, this was the most just, discreet and regular Course that could be taken on this Proposal, whatever Answer he might give, or Construction is put upon it. For it is not only the Duty, but the Safety of a Minister of State, to confult.

consult, as well as consider, how far the Operation of a Plan laid down by a Field Officer is practicable, how far it is consistent with the Treaties that subsist between his Master's Subjects and Allies, how well the latter relish, or are inclin'd to it, how able or willing to furnish Stores, Supplies, Provisions, Men and Money to make the Event successful, and whether the Gain or Loss will be greater, if it be so or not.

These Particulars must be conferr'd upon, and concerted by the Civil Powers, who are equally concern'd, before the Military Powers, who are otherwise busied in their Sphere, in their own Duty and Discipline, their Camps, Marches, &c. can put them in Execution.

Thus we see, that all the Operations of a Confederate Army are, and must be mutually settled by all Parties: So that, in Fact, this Scheme could not be executed without the Confent of the Dutch, therefore it was indispensably requisite to confult with them upon this Head; particularly at a Time when the Affairs in Holland grew fo ticklish or precarious, and that rotten Government was at a Loss how to preserve or support itself. Therefore, that they might better compass their Self-preservation, and more directly preserve their own Safety, they waited for every little frivolous Pretention to alienate themselves from their Allies: And undoubtedly, as our Difregard of their Opinion, or Disposition upon this Occasion, would have been the Cause, fo their Defertion would have been the Effect, if the B-rs had fuffer'd this Plan to have been executed, without any Consultation thereupon with the Dutch.

Although I have hitherto confined myself pretty much to Foreign Transactions, I cannot help touching transiently on a sew Domestick Passages in your Libel, and particularly in Pages 16, 17, and 18, where there are some flagrant, if not flagitious ones. 'Tis there you give us an Account of the Contract which the two B—rs made with the Bread-Bottoms, and how the different Leaders, and

and Heads of Parties, were introduced to his - by the B-rs, and by what Means they receiv'd a Court Abfolution. Give me Leave, Sir, to observe to you, that, in the Detail of your Discourse, you do not approve yourfelf that Friend to his - and the R - F - as, with some Readers, you would delusively infinuate yourfelf to be; for if you were, you would not falfely represent his - in a Light so mean and disadvantageous as you do. I am shock'd also at those Expressions which attempt to render an exalted Character fo abject; when all the World can give Testimony of that inherent Valour and Magnanimity in him, which are most averse and repugnant to any fuch pufillanimous Submission, any fuch Kind or Degree of Slavery as you would fuggeft: Therefore it must be none but his Enemies, who can offer to infuse such despicable Conceptions of his --- 's being a C--e to his M-s; which would firike him with greater Horror; than if he was really one to his most professed Foes. Human Nature, especially in those of the highest Dignity, is most jealous of any Bondage, and most impatient under it; nor can they endure any Proportion of it, without the highest Resentment; as the Poet truly fays,

Condemn'd to Fetters, and to Scepters born ! 'Tis in this State, unhappy Princes mourn.

But what Mourning, what Complaints, what Exprobations do we hear of, as we should loudly enough do, if there was any Truth in these seditions Intimations? If there is none; were the old Talion Law to be put in Execution, and yourself made the Judge, in any other Case but your own, I would leave you to determine, whether he who salfely persuades another, he is suffering under a State of Bondage or Imprisonment, did not deserve to be truly punish'd with it himself? If the necessary Decorum of a proper Reservation, in Persons of supreme Authority, to prevent their becoming popularly cheap and samiliar; or if a benign and gracious Deportment, a generous Confidence in, or Complaisance towards their Ministers, Officers, &c.

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according to their Rank, whom they employ, or with whom they treat, as far also as is proper and most consistent with the Dignity invested in them, must be called C—t—y, I leave you to reconcile the Propriety of the Term to Men of Sense; to those whom you have lest distatisfied in it, and who may call upon you for a further Explanation thereof.

A monstrous Disparity, also there is, in your Parallels of Times and Events; fuch as you introduce of King John. Henry III. Edward, and Richard II. To compare them and their Ministers, with the present Princes and their Administration, and to write of such distant, or disproportioned Reigns, by skimming off their superficial and general Similitudes, or by fuch ftrained and partial Conformity to the Doctrine of Parallels, as you and others, to serve some present Ends have attempted, has by confounding of Times, distorting and maining of Characters, in extending of some and rescinding of others, no less than by abridging and contracting that natural Variety there is in the Springs of Human Actions, proved one of the greatest Corruptions of History. Such tyrannical Treatment, is like that wherewith a certain noble Robber of Attica, named Procrustes. was want to entertain his Guests; who was not content to Plunder them of whatever they had, most rich and valuable, but must cripple them too; by reducing every one he pleased to the Measure of his own Bedstead: If they were too short, they were racked and stretched out, if too tall, chopped off at the Legs, to the Extent, or Dimensions of it. The fame use is made of these malevolent Comparisons, and commonly with the fame Humanity, when any modern Characters of Fminence are to be reduced to the Standard of some that are most fit for the Purpose in Antiquity; whereby the Merits of Friends and Favourites may be lengthenedout, and those of Competitors and Antagonists, shortned to the Patterns or Examples prepared, or shaped out for them: But more especially, when such incomparable Comparisons are drawn out by your Grumble-Tonians, and those, who despairing of having any Power in the Government, cannot leave fnarling and growling out Invectives

vectives against such as have. This Way of writing, has been an old Artifice, to distaisfy or incense a Prince against his Ministry, and the People against their Prince; and if he who wilfully fires an House, is justly sentenced to Death, as a capital Offender, I know not what Punishment that Incendiary deserves, who kindles such Fuel as may instame a whole Nation: If you urge, that it is but the Embers of Two B—rs, that you have been raking up, and that no great Danger can be feared from them; I answer, that it is not to be heeded, how few the Sparks are, or even how small, in those Embers, so much as how combustible the Matter that may be about them.

Page 26. You give us another Specimen of your perfound Skill in State Policy, or rather your zealous Propenfity again, to the Porpagation of State Difcords and Diffentions, tho' you prove yourfelf, but a Novice, in the wife and well-contrived Form of our Oeconomical Constitution thereby. For never was an H-r Ap-t, with so many shining Qualities, as you justly celebrate in ours by any prudent Managers of the Govenment in this, or any other Country, placed at the Right Hand of the T-e. With how many Instances are we now furnished, of the melancholy Difasters that have befallen whole Countries, whenever fuch an indifcreet and difadvantageous Position has been preferred, as would make the two greatest Luminaries of the Kingdom most effectually eclipse one another? Such Contiguity, whereby Monarchy in Possession might be skreened or interposed by Monarchy in Reversion would be looked upon in the Art of Politicks, as a Disposition of Power no less profuse or improvident, than in the Fewller's Art he would be, to gild over a Diamond, or in the Science of Heraldry, the laying of Or upon Or. Besides an H-r Ap—t is always looked upon, and indeed, is no more than a Subject to his S-n Fa-r, as by the Motto under his Pr---ly Cognizance, is, to this Day, most dutifully acknowledged; For these Reasons, among others, it has been thought most eligible, by our best experienced Managers of Government, from the most wholesome Rules and Examples of State Policy, that 'tis most to the Interit

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Interest of the Nation, as well as the S-n, and his Su-r himself, that he should have a Situation, or Court allowed, becoming his State and Dignity, separate to himfelf. I have all the Reason I could wish, to believe, that if the H-r Ap-t were preferred to a Station fo near the Th-e, he would most certainly, shew and express the greatest reverential Regard to his R-F-, and make the best use of the Power that should be invested in him. But as to any Arguments that might be advanced to reduce fuch a Proposition to Practice, they are either here sufficiently answered, or it is totally unnecessary to expatiate further upon them; fince they have neither fwayed, nor do confift with those Maxims, Rules and Customs, which have prevailed in the Appointment of different Establishment; fince they might only further tend to diffurb and diffatisfy those Heads and Hearts, which are of equal Depth and Disposition with your own, to relish the Bleffing of a prudent and quiet Government; and fince they are what the Two B-re have nothing to do with.

I cannot omit observing here, that none but the most inveterate Enemies to the R-I H-e of H-r, and fuch whose reftless Heads are continually agitated and tormented with the Vertige, or Difease of Revolution, could ever fee any Prospect of Encouragement, in creating a Misunderstanding between the H-r Ap-t, and the Two B-rs: For they have, with the most indefatigable Zeal, exerted the utmost of their Power, in promoting the Interest of the H—e of H—re; so that, it would be a most unpreportionable Return, if any of the S-rs of this august H-e, should reward such faithful and unwearied Diligence in their Establishment, with any Disgrace or other Indignity, instead of the most gracious and honourable Acknowledgments. If fuch Gratitude were to become a Court Fashion, who would not hereafter fear to ferve a P-e, in his most just and important Occasions? But these ungrateful Infusions can only work upon Ignorance, Prejudice and Ingratitude itself; therefore, I am perfuaded, Sir, you may give over your Endeavours on this Head, and despair in Time, that any Notions of such

ignominious Treatment can ever find Harbour in any noble and generous Mind: For, God be thanked, our H—r Ap—t, is endowed with fuch virtuous Qualities, such fine Discernment, and happy Intelligence, as will enable him, not only to perform all Things that must redound to his own Honour, and the true Interest of his Country; but to perceive how easily those, who have selfishly studied nothing but their own Ends, may fall thereby, into that Disgrace themselves, which they have thus enviously, or maliciously, been contriving for others.

But here we must return a little to the Foreign Affairs; where, Page 24. You charge the Two B-rs, that they warried the Dutch, and compelled the Queen of Hungary to confeat to the Extension of the Command to the D-e over the whole Army. Here, Sir, you are milinformed. It is true, there was Application made, for the D-e to Command the whole Confederate Army; but then, the Case is quite otherwise, than as you represent, and vainly persuade us it was: Therefore I will endeavour to set you right in the Truth of this Matter, if you have any towardly Inclinations in you to embrace it; for, in Fact, the Affair was this. - The P of O his Party, by this Time, did confiderably increase among the People; his few Friends in the Council, did improve their Adherence, as much as lay in their Power; and, as they forefaw, that if the Army continued in the Hands of the contrary Party, then their great Delign, might probably, in the very Attempt, miscarry, or be entirely suppressed with the Army; therefore his faid Friends were actually the first, who privately promoted, and advifedly confented to the invefting of the D-e with the Command of the whole Army : And then, if our M-rs laid hold of this fair Opportunity, to cultivate their favourable Disposition, by joining their Application, for bringing the same more effectually to pass, is this, Sir, to be branded with any fuch arbitrary or violent Terms, or Measures, as Worrying and Compulsion?

That this was a prudent step of our Friends at the Hague, is manifest, by that great and memorable Event,

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the Election of the P- of O- to the Hereditary Stadholdership of all the United Provinces; how unsuitable foever the Reflections may be, that have been made of it: And that, by this Means, the faid Command has produced more good Effects, than ever could be expected from a Commander of Inferior Rank, is without all Doubt; for, the Court of V—a and the Dutch, never could, nor indeed would have fuffered their Armies to be headed by a General, who, in Quality, was below the D-e, lest they should raise Contentions for that Authority, among Competitors of greater Equality with one another, and difgust several Princes who had Commissions in the faid Armies And it was of the highest Importance, to intrust the Army under the Conduct of a Commander, in whose Integrity they could fafely confide; for if the Dutch Army had not been thus fecured, the Election of a S-dh-r would certainly have been precarious, if not totally prevented; because the French Party in the Council at the Hague, would undoubtedly have recalled the Army, to oppose the Populace by Force, in the very Attempt of this Election; and that, all under the specious Name of restoring the Publick Tranquility; but as they could not have the Army to their Affistance, this grand Affair was brought about, without any great Difficulty, and scarcely any Bloodshed. Thus, Sir, you have beheld, by what Means the D-e became Commander in Chief of the Confederate Army, and what happy Ends it has answered in this respect. Is it not therefore a Barbariy, of which the very Turks, who are remarkable for calling their Prime Ministers, under the least Pretence, to Account, when they have a Mind to facrifice them, would, or might be ashamed; to conceal the Truth, introduce such enormous Falfities, and pervert the good Deeds or Actions, into Capital Offences, of those they defign to make their Victims? For when they have no real Crimes to charge them with, and yet their Destruction is resolved on, they fend them Word, that their Death is determined, either by the Janazaries, Grand Signor, or Mahamed; and indeed, to gratify such humane and sweet tempered Gentlemen as them, and yourfelf, it would be the shortest Way among Christians Gristians, to introduce Turkish Principles, in the Treatment of English Ministers. But before we part with these Principles, wherein ye so harmoniously agree, let me invite you to hear those of a Heathen, or rather to read them aloud, before any Company, in which this friendly Epiftle may be canvaffed; if you can do it, undifturbedly, and without much change of Countenance. "As we would," fays my Author, " that a Painter, who is to draw a beau-"tiful Face, in which there is yet wanting fomething to " render it perfect, should neither totally omit, nor rigidly " express, that which is defective; because this, would " deform it; and that, spoil the Resemblance: So, since "it is very hard, nay almost impossible, to display the Life "and Transactions of the greatest Man, wholly free from " all Frailty, Failure or Overfight, let us in the same Man-"ner follow Truth: And if some Lapses should occur, " which have been occasioned by any Misrepresentation of others, any Emotion of fudden Passion in themselves, or "the mere Necessity of the Times, let us look upon them, " rather as the Defects of Virtue, than as Vices; let us car-" ry the Pencil tenderly over them, out of respect to Hu-" man Nature; which never furnished any Man with so " many amiable Qualities, fo many Inclinations to Excelec lence, but that there was still wanting something, that "would furnish him to Perfection." Here my Author kindly ftops, to let you ruminate.

You endeavour in the succeeding Pages, to flatter the D—e; but, Pages 28 and 29, the Scene is changed, to a gourse and unsavourable Prospect; for here you begin to anatomize him and reduce him to a mere Skeleton. You seem to intimate, or rather, boldly affert, that he did not understand the Art of War; but of this, like the rest, there is still wanting sufficient Proof. To make us link with you in Belief; the Reasons you offer, of his Youth and Inexperience, are too weak and insufficient. Have we not many Examples before our Eyes, and partiticularly one, in the last War, of a young Hero, who has throughout the whole Course of it been, both an amazing Conqueror, and surprising Transactor of Affairs in the Closet:

and that, without any Affistance or Advice? He has not only succeeded in every Thing he has undertaken, but all the World must own, that he has performed all these Affairs with the greatest Prudence and Conduct imaginable; and yet he was not only young, but also unexperienced: So that, not only from this, but many Instances more, too tedious here to enumerate, it is very manifest, that Age and Experience, tho advantageous Concomitants, are not always the only, or absolute Requisites, to make a good Counsellor in the Closet, or Hero in the Field.

But your Performance is extraordinary, where you enter' upon the Artana of the two B-rs, the Magazine of their Secrets, tho' by what Means or Intelligence we fee not; however, being only known to yourfelf, you Pamphleteer it freely away to the Publick, without any Proof or Evidence at all; expecting every Body will build the most firm and folid Structures of Belief upon your imaginary Foundations. Such frothy Food may fatisfy your Pohitick Camelions, and those who chuse to feast upon Air, but will starve all those who expect, and are capable of digesting, any substantial Entertainment. To those it obvioufly appears, that it was impossible you could give the true and real Motives of the two B-rs, for putting the D-e at the Head of the Army; and if ever they were the principal Means of it, it is but reasonable to suppose that they would referve fuch Secrets, of the utmost Confequence, to themselves: Therefore this lame and tottering Affertion, wanting the Feet of Authority, cannot stand long, or support itself in the Credit of rational Readers, without falling to the Ground.

It is confpicuously known how the D—e has been educated, and that he was designed for a chief Commander from his Infancy; that he was constantly trained to it, and in his most early Years introduced into the Army: Considering these Circumstances on one Hand, and on the other, the private Sollicitations of our Friends at the H—e, as was before related: I say, it cannot then, with any Colour of Reason be suggested, that it was the original Act of the two B—rs, nor that they could possibly have any secret Views or sinisfer Designs in the same, as you endeavour to

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perfuade us: So superficial or sophistical, is your whole Representation of this Matter.

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In the next Pager, 30, 31 and 32, The good Underflanding between the D—e, as Commander in Chief of
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what Means he was advanced to the Head of it, all your Conjectures on this Matter, will clearly diffipate and vanish away; more especially, when we consider, that the Two B-rs have a firmer Footing in the Civil Power, than they can possibly think of obtaining by a Military one; for this, as it would be a weaker, so it would be both a more uncertain and more dangerous Support; and as they are at present, in a State of perfect Safety, it wou'd be Madness to run into one of so much Jeopardy. For, that the Military Power, can never be that Supporter of a Civil one, as you suggest, I could prove to you by innumerable Instances, of which it may be sufficient only to refer, to what we may daily see with our Eyes, in that Contempt wherewith the Civil Power is treated throughout those Neighbouring Countries, where the Military Power previls; which demonstrates, that these Powers cannot agree, and the last is almost incapable of subsisting, where the former is predominant. So that it cannot be imagined, that he who is once at the Head of the Civil Power, will ever dream of being most firmly or safely sustained in it, by a Military one; especially as the latter is maintained by, and dependent upon the former. But if you think that the Sanding Army is still too great, make a Motion in the H- of C-ns, and if it is made apparent, that our Forces are fill too numerous, I am persuaded, the Two B --- rs will not be against a further Reduction, of those that shall be deem'd superfluous or unnecessary, tho' we daily fee, and hear, that whole Regiments of Sea and Land Forces are difbanded and reduced ; at which all our Neighbours are greatly furpriz'd, confidering how Affairs at present in Europe stand; and tho' it has created many Disputes, both in Parliament and Print, which is the most prudent Step, to disband our Army and Marines, or keep ourselves still in a manner arm'd? I confess, I am for the latter, and that upon no other Account than for the Sake of Self-preservation. But I will not expatiate upon this Topic, because it has already been most accurately handled, and, to revive it afresh, might draw the whole Cabal upon me, that endeavours to over-rule all Measures of Government, without Reason or Foundation. But 70,000 70,000 Men are not so easily raised, as you imagine, at least, it cannot be done by the common Way of Rectuiting, imperceptably, as you suggest: So that we may be very easy on this Head.

Your other Suggestions, which you call ugly Symptoms, and from which you draw frightful Consequences, were current among the Jacobites, about two Years ago; and from those Gentry, you have, to alarm the Public, copied these ugly Symptoms, which were first raised by the crasty Ring-leaders of that Faction, to serve their Ends; and I am heartily forry to find, that such a blessed Patriot, as you endeavour to appear, such an Enemy to Strife and Dissention, such a Promoter of Concord and Quietness, one so desirous of making his great Loyalty, Candour and Abilities, thine thro the Understanding and Memory of Mankind, should so imperceptably, so seemingly unawares, or unknown to himself, prostitute his Pen in the Service of such a Threadbare and shabby Cause.

But, Sir, if you could really make fuch Facts good, against the Two B-re, what need was there of going this Way by Pamphleteering, to work, and by that Means, to raife infignificent Prejudices among that Rank of People, mostly in private Condition, which are ineffec-tual, and cannot avail your Purposes? There is a shorter, juster, more equitable, as well as more noble and effectual Way of Proceeding, than this, if they are guilty of the enormous Crimes wherewith you load them; which is, in the House of Commons. Introduce your Allegation there, and make them good; and then, it will to some Contequence appear, and to the most considerable, the most equal Judges, that you truly are, what you endeavour to feem; whereas at prefent, no Body can judge oth rwife, but that this Production is the overflowing of your Gall, or Spleen, upon fome Difappointment or other, by one or other of the Two B-rs, in some Preferment, or other like Cause of Discontent; for it is impossible that those who are at the Head of Publick Affairs, especially here in England, where the Nation is so much divided into Parties, can gratify them all; and therefore this abject,

vulgar Method, roar out to the Multitude for Revenge; as the Puritan of Amsterdam more successfully did, against one of the finest trained Creatures for the Field, in a certain Nobleman's Pack, because he had deprived him of a dainty Morsel, on which he had proposed to feast: His Conscience or his Courage, would not let him beat him; no, he would not, for the Indies, hurt a Hair of his Head, but he would give him a bad Name; so drove the generous Creature, whose true Characteristic was Fidelity itself, into the Streets, and cry'd out, a mad Dog; thus having consigned him to the Mob, they, without Examination or Enquiry into his great and capital Offences, knock'd out his Brains.

From Page 33, to 37, you give the Two Bwith Sir R ----, equal Share in the former Administration, and in all the foregoing Pages, you allow them no Share in his Ministry, nor for some Time after. But, however, you cannot do otherwise; you will make the Two B-rs guilty, right or wrong, which were impossible to be done, but by your sophistical Reasons and falle History. For here you become sensible, that our Misfortunes are owing, as I have already observed, to the mistaken Measures and pacific Disposition of that former M --- r; and therefore, with all your Labour, you find it impossible to question or challenge the Two B-unless you bring them headlong into the former Administration; and when the Scene of Affairs begins to shift, and Saxony and Bavaria recovered, then the Two B—rs must not be in the Ministry, but some other Favourites must be intitled to the Merits thereof: And then again, fo foon as the Affairs go not fuccessfully on, the Two B---rs are brought in to appear in the Conduct thereof; and all this for no other Reason, but that they may be accused as the Fountain of all our Difafters. And, indeed, Sir, I am not furprifed that you are not ashamed at yourself, throughout all these monstrous Prevarications, Contradictions, and Intanglements of Truth; which are so palpable, that the meanest Capacity can discover them, If the B--rs had a Share, during Sir R _____ 's Time in the Administration

ministration, they had it undoubtedly, in Times after him, when Affairs did change for the better; and, in course, a Share in the Merit of the same: But it is needless to reason upon this Head; for all the Nation, and all Europe know, that the B——rs were no Partners with Sir R—— in the Administration: They had indeed their Posts, but never any Share in the main Management, or Direction of Affairs, either Domestic or Foreign; and therefore could deserve no Share in the Censure.

But notwithstanding the several Difficulties and Disadvantages under which they labour'd, they would actually have retrieved more than they have done, if they had met with an hearty Concurrence in some of their Proceedings, and had not been interrupted by some unfortunate Interventions in others; for in the midst of that flourishing Progress the French was in, the Two B_____rs omitted no Opportunity to rescue P___a from an Alliance with France; and when thus the English and Austrian Party at that Court gained Ground, and opened the Way for the succeeding Treaty of Dresden, then the unnatural Rebellion in Scotland broke out; whereby we were obliged to withdraw, not only our own Troops, but also 6000 Dutch, from Flanders; and, if this fatal Incident had not happened, the French would never have made those Conquests there, which they afterwards did.

Since I have mentioned this infamous Rebellion, which has been so detrimental to the last War, I cannot help observing, how much we debase ourselves in the Opinion of our Neighbours; how much associately are, at our being so easily deluded into Party Contests against one another; which our Enemies are ever watching for, to soment and blow them up into intestine Commotions! It is an eternal Scandal and Reproach to this Nation, that so many of our Countrymen become thus the Fools, the Tools and Vassals of these French, and other foreign Foes, and all by this Means, only to contrive their own Enslavement; to become Traitors, as unavoidably to themselves, and their Families, as their contemporary Countrymen, and all their

their Posterity: But 'tis observable, that you do not chuse to enter into the Particulars of this Affair, because you could not do it without allowing some singular Commendations to the Two B rs, who so eminently exerted themselves in the quelling and defeating of this Rebellion, and must consequently therein be acknowledged the Two principal Guardians of these Three Kingdoms.

How monftroully absurd therefore is it, for you to accuse them, in Page 43, with even conniving at the Growth of this Rebellion? I wonder you did not, by the same Rule of Reason, and Justice to Veracity, affirm too, that they were private Promoters of the Pretender's Interest. tell us, that all Europe was amazed at the Behaviour of the Two B—rs; but it may be much more fo, at the Unconscionableness of your false Assertion, because it is absolutely incredible. You endeavour to establish this Accusation, by boasting of Proofs, but have produced none; which you would furely have done, if you had really preferved fuch material and authentic Proofs, as would render Doubt impossible. Of these, we cannot judge, because we are left unacquainted with them; but what your Meaning is, what Ends you aim at, or what Cenfure you deferve yourfelf, for making fuch a flagrant Charge, without fatisfying your Readers with any Authority for the same; I fay, fuch difingenuous Asperfions, which almost every Individual in the Nation, knows to be false, and of which, not only a great Part of Europe besides, but even all the Jacobites themselves, to my certain Knowledge, have already, before your Performance appeared in the World, given their Testimony to the contrary, in Favour of the Two B rs, may highly deferve a more folemn and judicial Examination, than is here pretended to.

Almost in every Paragraph, you are repeating your Charge against the Two B—rs, of their aiming at nothing so much, as to ruin the War, as the only one, where you endeavour to accuse them with; and I have already made it manifest, that this Charge is without any Foundations whatsoever, and it will so evidence itself, as

to render it past all manner of Doubt, from what I shall further observe upon this Head hereafter. But, Page 41 and 42, you endeavour to support this Imputation, with a Story fo incredible, that you vainly labour to render it plaufible; because what you affert, is, undoubtedly, a plain Proof against your own Assertion: For, if it was the Intention of the Two B rs to ruin the War, they would then have thrown some other Impediment more effectual in the Way, and therefore would not only have utterly refused to furnish the D---e with fighting Orders, but also have omitted every other Means that would promote the fame: For, by this Time, the D-e had gained Experience to his Theory in War, and therefore, if your Affertion had been the real Caufe, they would not thus precariously had risqued their favourite Scheme, by merely conjecturing what the Troops would, or would not do. And besides, you do not give us a right Calculation of the Forces then under his Command; for there were also Hestians and Austrians in the Army, which you have forgot to mention; and befides this, the Dutch did not all turn Tail; they were but 3000 Men at the utmoft, who were defective in their Duty, the rest perform'd it.

To this, we may add another Confideration; that Fighting Orders are never illued in that Sense you take it, for they are always directed to the Commanding General, to attack with Conduct, first to be settled in a Council of War, held on the Spot for that Purpose, in which, is always confulted the best Manner; and where no Advantage is to be gain'd, or offers in their Favour, the fame is declined or postpon'd. Therefore, Sir, if the Two B had furnished the D-e with fuch Orders to attack the Enemy, without his first calling a Council of War, and without his having previously informed himfelf of the Enemies Strength and Situation, &c. but attack them at all Adventures, without confidering any Obstacles whatsoever; or if he had actually engaged them without the Opinion of a Council of War, without any apparent Probability of Advantage, and contrary to all Advice or Prof-pect of Success, then, I say, your Assertion might

have some Air of Plausibility; but so long as you cannot absolutely prove such peremtory Fighting Orders, or such incautelous and premature Management in the Camp, without any Consultation in Councils of War, your Assertion will ever appear Self-convicted, without the Trouble of our proving any farther Absurdity of Incongruity in it, and in open Defiance of any Support or Countenance you can further give it.

In Page 46, At the Emperor's Death, you bring the young Elector of B ___ a on the Stage, whom you represent as of the greatest Importance to our Cause and Interest; but his Forces, his Interest in the Electoral College, and the whole Power of this Prince, are, according to your Affertion, rejected by the two B____rs and you heavily complain, that they have not made any proper Ule of them : But a little further, Page 48, you complain as much, that we are actually engaged with these very R-ns, whom you just before so much wanted, and that they were now received into the Number of our Dependants, if not Allies. Thus, I leave all the World to judge, how plainly you contradict yourfelf, and how publickiy you confess yourself at a Loss in not knowing what you would be at, by confessing, how great a Stranger you are, as to this Matter, in that you cannot determine, Whether the B-ns are our Allies or Dependants?

It is almost unnecessary to answer this Part of your Story, as it is already, from your egregious Contradictions, and Corruptions of the Truth, obvious, that you either are not capable of attaining to it yourself, or not willing to display it sincerely to others: Yet, for the sake of these, I may here unravel so much of this Occurrence, as will enable those who are most slenderly acquain ted therewith, and even of the shallowest Capacity, to discern your unpardonable Mistakes, or fallacious Misrepresentations thereof. It is so well known, as to be beyond all dispute, that before the E---m-- r died, his Army was deseated, his Country ruined, and he had nothing less

left to subsist on, but what the French Court allow'd him. When his Son, the present E-1-r, a Prince of excellent Qualities, came to the Throne, he was hardly able to bring 6,000 Men into the Field, and those being the Remains of many Regiments, therefore not in a Condition of taking the Field immediately, it requir'd fome Time to equip them; and indeed, if there had been Money, they might in a short Time, have been considerably augmented; for the Austrians evacuated B-a, and released the B-n Prisoners; which were all Means that served this so much wanted Augmentation. Now it is most publickly known. that this Prince, immediately after his Imperial Father's Death, enter'd into the Confederate Alliance, and with the Subfidies he received from us, and our Allies, he brought his Troops into good Condition, confiderably augmented them, and fent them into the Confederate Army; where they shared of all the Warlike Operations and Fatigues, with the greatest Intrepity and Resolution: And these are such known Truths, that all Europe is a Witness of them. Is it then not astonishing to the last Degree, to charge the two B_rs with such open Falshoods when every Individual can be so easily acquainted with the Truths themselves, which are so manifest, and of such a publick Nature, as must most unan-Iwerably detect and refute them? But there is nothing aftonishing in these Days, especially where Spleen, Malice, and Envy, or Ambition, Avarice and Pride, have gained the Ascendancy over the Reason and Discretion of Men.

I have before observed, that the Addition of the B-HForces to the Consederates, could not in any wise be decisive or determinate; and this has confirmed itself, by the Experience last mentioned; nor did P-Wof H, act the low Part of a T-1, when he laid the Blame of the Miscarriage of the Tr-y of H-u upon the E- of G-, which was but the common Belief of every Body, that had any Intelligence of this Matter: Neither ought this Tr-y, or that of W-s, to have ever been ratified, as was before hinted,

hinted, without the K— of P—. The Overfight was wondered at, on all Sides, the Advantages it lost the Confederates, plainly beheld, and by what Prejudices against these who advised it, the Coalition of that Interest therein was rejected.

Page 47, You endeavour to charge the two B____rs with the Loss of Bruffels, owing to our not having the Bavarians in our Service, and your Reason is, that our Allies were not then in a Condition to defend it: But. give me Leave to affure you, that the Case was not so as you would represent it; for we were then obliged to withdraw our Troops from Flanders, to oppose that Insurrection, which was then raised in our own Country, by those very good Friends to it, the Jacobites: And then it was the Duty of the D-ch to defend Bruffels; but as they were at that Time fo remarkably Frenchified, they absolutely refused to hinder the French from taking this Place, tho' the Prince of Waldeck, who then commanded the D-h Troops, most earnestly assured the States General, that the F--- h endeavoured to take it by Surprize; and plainly fet forth, in what Manner their Attempts might easily be prevented. But all this had no Effect; nothing was approved of, or put in Execution to oppose it; so that the F____ h had nothing else to do, but to take Possession; which vexed the brave and excellent Prince of Waldeck, to that Degree, that he threw up his Commission: And pray, Sir, how do you like this true Account of the Matter, in answer to your false one.

After this, you go on for a while, very censoriously, to find Fault with every Thing that was done in the Field, without giving any colourable Reason or Authority to confirm the same; but are, every Moment, drawing your incomprehensible Consequences of the two B——rs aiming at nothing else but the Ruin of the War; which, as it is but the same stale Dish over again, only broil'd, and fry'd, and differently cook'd up, to make it go down; tho' having no Relish or Goodness in it at first, but soon growing nauseous to the Palate of Truth, and unsit for

any wholfome Digestion, I shall finally throw it out, among the other Offal of your Political Entertainment.

So I proceed to follow you to the Subject of the Russian Troops, in Page 64, which you have handled fo like a Craftsmaster, that however crooked or wearisome the Path may appear, it will be necessary to trace you thro' all the Serpentine Windings of it. Here then, that you may, according to the usual Obliquity of your Plan, further deprive the two B-rs of their Merits, you acquaint us, that the E of G, fome Years before, recommended the biring a Body of Russian Troops, but that it was then rejected by the two B_rs. To this I answer, that, perhaps, the E- of G- might recommend this very Scheme; but it remains to be answered, Whether it was possible for him, at that Time, or any Body elfe, to bring the same into Execution? And this may be immediately resolved or decided, by looking into the Situation of Affairs then existing at the Court of Petersbourg, when, at one View it will appear, that it was utterly impossible for the E __ of G___ to bire any Troops from Ruffia: But to imagine, that in treating of fuch confiderable Affistance, that he did it in such a fordid Light, and with fuch contemptible Expressions as you do; as if it were generous enough in us, to degrade that Service and Favour we were at the same Instant seeking; by saying only we could bire it, implys such a Complication of Indignity, towards that powerful Ally, with Ingratitude, at the very Juncture we wanted the Shelter of its Power, and Insolence, at the Time that we were sensible of our own Imbecility, as would very much derogate from the high Opinion which the World conceives of that great Politician, who endeavoured to be at the Head of Affairs; if, I fay, in no better, than the coarfe Colours, wherewith you daubt it out; he could use only such sneering and mechanical Phrases towards those, who might be, in his Mafter's greatest Exigencies, his greatest Auxiliaries, altho' it were only in Embrio, or Proposition. Those who are in a State of Neutrality, or Independency, and totally unneedful of fuch Supplies, may think of them as F 2 they

they please, or call them Mercineries; but those that frand in need of their Aid and Affistance, will find other Language to treat with, or of them.

To look then into these Times, wherein the E- of G--, according to your Account, did recommend the hire of these Troops, you will find, that First, But shortly before a Revolution had happened the Russian Government. Secondly, That in this very Revoltion, the present Empress was elevated upon the Th-e. Thirdly. Therefore, the absolutely required her Forces at Home, for her own further Safety. Fourthly, That the French Party had a great Share in this Revolution, was, at this Time, the most prevailing at Court, and continued so, till the Year 1744, when by the Difgrace of the Marquis de la Chetardie, only glimmering Hopes remained for us to promote our Interest; for the Treaties you mention, Page 67, that were concluded with the Courts of London and Vienna, in 1742, and 1746, did not, in any Ways, oblige the Court of Petersbourg to take Part in the late War; and tended to nothing elfe, but to acknowledge one another, in their respective Stations: In this Situation of Affairs, I ask, How was it possible to bire any Troops from R—a, how much soever the E—of G might dream of it?

It is well known, that the French Party did maintain themselves at the Court of P - g, till the latter End of 1746, when the Scene changed in our Favour, which the two B—rs immediately did improve, and do the utmost in their Power to reap the Advantages of; and they were so successful, as to obtain 30,000 Auxiliaries, whereby the good of the common Cause is notably restored, and the Russian Ambassador now residing at our Court. His Excellency Count Ez - w has, with his extraordinary Address and Application, been greatly instrumental to facilitate and accomplish this good Understanding between our Court, and bis; for which he deserves the sincere Thanks and Esteem of the whole Nation.

It is also well-known, and Europe can witness it, that while the Treaty for these Auxiliary Troops, was in Agitation, the French, to the utmost of their Power, did endeavour to prevent the fame; but when they perceived they could not, they then endeavour'd to the last Degree, to throw every Obstruction they cou'd in the Way of these Troops, to impede or retard the March of them, hoping by some Accident or other, by Weariness, Dejection of Spirit, Mutiny, Defertion, Sickness, or want of Provision, &c. they might frustrate their Advancement towards, or Conjunction with the Confederate Army. For this Purpose, they fent Emissaries into Poland, to raise civil Commotions; and for no other Reason, but to delay this March: Many other Obstacles they devised, but all in vain; and for some of these Practices, the Count de Salle was detected, and imprison'd at Dantzic. Here now it appears openly, and beyond all controversy, how essential it was thought by our Enemies, these Troops would be in deciding the common Cause, and rendering Ineffectual all further Opposition; yet to defeat all those that had been made by the Fronch, to hinder the faid March, or Conjunction, the Two B___rs were most assiduous; and, notwithstanding all these Artifices of Enemies, the Two B-rs brake through, and overcome all the Impediments contrived thereby, to their everlasting Honour.

Here, Sir, let us pause and consider a Moment, Whether, if what you so repeatedly affirm be true, That the Two B——rs endeavourd to Ruin the War, because they would thereby oppose the E— of G——, and his Measures; they wou'd in any likelihood, thro' all these Difficulties, hire those Auxiliaries, the very Project, and Recommendation of that E— of G—— himself, and then so highly regard, as to put that in Practice, which was the Invention of their Rival, in Opposition to their own Measures? Are there not Madmen in Bedlam, whose Arguments are more reconcilable? But as it is a Jesuitical kind of Expression, you have been so fond of, for the Ruin of the War, is but an equivocal Phrase, and may signify not only, the Ruin of its Success, by starving

it of Supplies, Recruits, &c. but the Ruin of its very Being, among the contending Powers, when the Weaker is so strengthned, that the stronger Party can see no Hopes of Advantage, but the prospect of Victory hovering between both, upon doubtful Wings, they are both brought more easily to Accommodation; and so, the War is ruined, by, what all Sides defire it should be, a Peace: In this Sense the Two B_____rs may be said to have ruin'd the War, by bringing down the Northern. Auxiliaries to enforce the Confederates, who otherwise, might have been ruin'd by it: And further, in this Sense, it deserves to be considered, whether those unpacified Minds ever deserve to taste the Comforts of Peace, who can fo ungratefully exclaim against, and revile such providential Ruin of the War, which has so honourably preferv'd its Warriors from Ruin?

Those Auxiliaries made also a more effectual Progress, by their Land March, than ever could be expected, if they had been transported by Water, and landed in the Baltick; for if this Course had been pursued, then certain Powers could eafily have made such Diversions, that all the Service which could have been expected from these Troops would have been reduced to nothing; but as the Way was directed them through Poland into Germany, where it was too tender a Point to oppose them, because they were then arrived at the very Vitals, it was thereupon more expedient for all opposite Powers to embrace a general Pacification, without regarding any Naval Scheme they might have in view; for now it became neceffary for them, to defift from compleating the fame, as for us, it was prudent to lay hold of this Opportunity, in order to make fuch a Peace, as we may daily improve, if our own Indolence, Discontent and Dissentions do not disable us; and all these fortuitious Circumstances and Events could never have joined, or succeeded one another, if these Troops had been transported by Water, and landed in the Baltick.

I could prove this more copiously, with many convincing Particulars, but have already exceeded the Limits whereunto whereunto I proposed to confine myself; but whenever my Pen turns into this Track again, I will not only make this Argument more evident, tho' it must be to many sufficiently so, from what has been already said, but also shew you, that the Overtures or Proposals of France, whereof you take Notice, in Page 56, were inconsistent with, and would have been detrimental to the Interest of the Nation, if they had been accepted. But now I will proceed, shortly to recapitulate what the two B—rs have performed, more than in moral Probability could be expected in our present Circumstances.

I. If we recollect from what has been before related, it will plainly appear, that they have, by their Tranfactions, intirely frustrated that Naval Plan, which was concerted by our Neighbours, wherein they already were so far advanced; for the French Navy itself is worsted, and they were not able to cause us to acknowledge a new Maritime Power, or any Settlement in other Parts of the World, the Definite in Treaty, or in Favour of other Powers thereupon depending.

II. They restored the Imperial Crown to the House of Austria, at such a precarious Juncture, when the same was transferr'd to the House of Bavaria, and the most considerable Powers in Germany did oppose the same; by which Means, all Germany is regained to our Interest.

III. By this Means the House of Austria is restored to the Condition of keeping a standing Army of 100,000 Men, provided they imitate their Neighbours, become frugal, and suffer the Military, to be the prevailing Power, in their Countries.

IV. Their obtaining the Hereditary Stadtholdership, for the P — of O —; whereby we can be enabled to have the Service of 50,000 Men upon any Emergency, at once, without Loss of Time; not as of late, when the Government was divided within itself.

V. The Alliance with Russia, which is of so great Consequence, that it gives the Sway in the Ballance of power.

power. I cou'd add other Instances of less Importance; but as these, at the first View, are obvious to every Body, they may, at this Time, suffice.

Laftly, Let us here consider, how these and other Advantages, which the Two B—rs, as faithful Guardians of these Nations, have obtained, may be improved.

First, As nothing cou'd be a greater Reproach to our Readiness in making a Peace with our Enemies, than our appearing more ready to go to War, with one another; so let us not be content with having ended our Wars Abroad, without being careful to cultivate all the Advantages of Peace at Home. As we know that nothing can hazard our Liberties and Properties, like Discords and Divisions, so let us learn, that nothing can more firmly secure them, than Concord and Unity; without which we shall be sure to make ourselves both the Prey of our Foreign Enemies, and their Scorn at the same Time.

Secondly, Instead of making ourselves Competitors in the Administration of State Affairs, and fomenting our own Malignities, in rivalling, undermining, and over-throwing others in Power, let us be ambitious of exerting our better and more laudable Qualities, in such Things, as will promote the Publick and National, more than our own Private Interest and Grandeur.

And, Thirdly, Let us enable our Ministers to establish a good Understanding with our Neighbours, and improve all the Advantages we are capable of, with our Allies; and when we can thus join Hand in Hand, we shall become a much more flourishing and happy People, than we are.

More might be faid, and may not be wanting, upon these Subjects, when the Author of this well-meant Endeavour shall find, he has had such hopeful and towardly Readers among those he design'd it for, that he has not labour'd in vain, more especially with yourself, for whom the same was principally intended, by,

4 AP 54 SIR, Yours, &c.

